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I. Introduction
Three trials
In 2008, a case stood unresolved before India’s High Court, calling for reading 
down Section 377 of the Indian Penal Code. That provision, almost 150 years 
old, punishes ‘carnal intercourse against the order of nature with any man, 
woman or animal’ with imprisonment up to life.1 This law, understood to 
criminalise consensual homosexual conduct, allows the state to invade the lives 
and intimacies of millions of adult Indians.
Five years earlier in the long-running case, India’s Ministry of Home Affairs 
had submitted an affidavit supporting Section 377. It said: ‘The law does not 
run separately from society. It only reflects the perception of the society ... 
When Section 377 was brought under the statute as an act of criminality, it 
1 As explained below, most law derived from British colonialism makes no distinction 
between homosexual acts committed with or without consent, or between 
homosexual acts committed by adults as opposed to adults’ abuse of children. 
Therefore, the petition aims to ‘read down’ rather than strike down the law. It asks 
the Court to state that consensual homosexual acts between adults are no longer 
criminal under the provision, while leaving intact Section 377’s application to non-
consensual acts and to children – until India passes a modern, gender-neutral rape 
law, and provides express legal protection for male children against sexual abuse.
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responded to the values and mores of the time in the Indian society’. The 
ministry claimed that, by comparison to the United Kingdom and the United 
States of America, ‘Objectively speaking, there is no such tolerance to [the] 
practice of homosexuality/lesbianism in the Indian society’. (High Court of 
New Delhi 2005).
This was sheer amnesia. Section 377, at its origin, did not respond to Indian 
society or its ‘values or mores’ at all. British colonial governors imposed it on 
India undemocratically. It reflected only ‘the British Judeo-Christian values of 
the time’, as the petitioners in the case told the court in reply (High Court 
of New Delhi 2005; see also Baudh 2008). Indeed, on 16 August 2008 – the 
61st anniversary of India’s freedom – the law’s opponents marched in Mumbai 
and demanded the UK government ‘apologise for the immense suffering that 
has resulted from their imposition of Section 377. And we call on the Indian 
government to abandon this abhorrent alien legacy … that should have left our 
shores when the British did’. (Taylor 2008). They chose the day because while 
‘India had got its independence from the British on this date in 1947, queer 
Indians were still bound by a British Raj law’. (QueerAzaadi 2008).
In a second case in the same month, in Malaysia, a court arraigned Anwar 
Ibrahim, former deputy prime minister and now a leader of the opposition. He 
stood charged with sexual relations with a male former aide, under Section 377 
of Malaysia’s penal code, which also criminalises ‘carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature’.
It was Anwar’s second trial for what the Malaysian press universally called 
‘sodomy’. Like the first charges, nine years earlier, these showed every sign of 
a political frame-up. Anwar had been preparing to return to political life in a 
parliamentary by-election when the allegations broke. If Malaysia’s government 
believed, as India’s apparently did, that the colonial-era law mirrored deep 
social prejudices, then the case was a perfect tool to discredit him.
Yet according to an opinion poll, two thirds of Malaysians thought politics 
lurked behind the charges, and only one third believed the criminal justice 
system could handle Anwar’s case fairly (Human Rights Watch 2008b). 
Regardless of how Malaysians felt about homosexual conduct, they did not trust 
the government to administer the law. The state’s handling of the evidence fed 
suspicions. Police had sent the man who filed the complaint to a hospital, for 
anal examinations designed to prove the charges: standard procedure in many 
countries. Embarrassingly, however, the tests – later leaked on the internet – 
apparently found no proof. The government vacillated, too, between charging 
Anwar with consensual and non-consensual ‘sodomy’. The uncertainty came 
easy. The law had only relatively recently made a distinction between the two 
– and it still provided virtually identical punishments, regardless of consent.
A third case came in Uganda, where three members of an organisation 
defending lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) people’s rights 
faced trial. They had staged a peaceful protest at an AIDS conference in 
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Kampala, drawing attention to the government’s refusal to respond to the 
pandemic among the country’s lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) 
communities. Police promptly arrested them and charged them with criminal 
trespass.
Seemingly the case had nothing to do with ‘sodomy’ or sex, but over it 
hung the shadow of Uganda’s law punishing ‘carnal knowledge against the 
order of nature’. That law, Section 140 of the criminal code, was also a British 
colonial inheritance, though in 1990 legislators had strengthened it, raising the 
highest penalty to life imprisonment. The government used the revised law to 
harass both individuals and activists who were lesbian or gay, censoring their 
speech, threatening them with prison, raiding their homes. Officials also relied 
on the law to explain, or excuse, their failure to support HIV/AIDS prevention 
efforts among LGBT people – the inaction that sparked the protest. Four 
years earlier, the minister of information had demanded that both the United 
Nations and national AIDS authorities shut out all LGBT people from HIV/
AIDS programs and planning. He cited the law against homosexual conduct 
(The Daily Monitor 2004).
[…]
There was no doubt, then, that the ‘trespass’ charges against the protesters 
aimed not just to suppress dissent, but to send a message that some people 
– ‘sodomites’, violators of the ‘carnal knowledge’ law – should not be seen 
or heard in public at all. President Yoweri Museveni, who had campaigned 
against LGBT people’s rights for a decade, reinforced that message at every 
opportunity. He called homosexuality ‘a decadent culture … being passed by 
Western nations’, warning: ‘It is a danger not only to the [Christian] believers 
but to the whole of Africa’ (New Vision 2008a). He praised Ugandans for 
‘rejecting’ it, and claimed that ‘having spinsters and bachelors was quite alien 
to Ugandan traditions’ (New Vision 2008b).
[…]
The atmosphere crackled with explosive menace. Hundreds marched in 2007 
to threaten punishment for LGBT people, calling them ‘criminal’ and ‘against 
the laws of nature’ (Human Rights Watch 2007c). Yet government ministers 
still warned that tougher anti-gay measures were needed. ‘Satan,’ one said, ‘is 
having an upper hand in our country’.2
Colonial laws and contemporary defenders
More than 80 countries around the world still criminalise consensual 
2 James Nsaba Butoro, ethics and integrity minister in the Museveni government, 
quoted in New Vision (2007).
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homosexual conduct between adult men, and often between adult women.3
These laws invade privacy and create inequality. They relegate people to 
inferior status because of how they look or who they love. They degrade people’s 
dignity by declaring their most intimate feelings ‘unnatural’ or illegal. They 
can be used to discredit enemies and destroy careers and lives. They promote 
violence and give it impunity. They hand police and others the power to arrest, 
blackmail, and abuse. They drive people underground to live in invisibility and 
fear.4
More than half those countries have these laws because they once were 
British colonies.
This report describes the strange afterlife of a colonial legacy. It will tell how 
one British law – the version of Section 377 the colonisers introduced into 
the Indian Penal Code in 1860 – spread across immense tracts of the British 
Empire.
Colonial legislators and jurists introduced such laws, with no debates 
or ‘cultural consultations’, to support colonial control. They believed laws 
could inculcate European morality into resistant masses. They brought in 
the legislation, in fact, because they thought ‘native’ cultures did not punish 
‘perverse’ sex enough. The colonised needed compulsory re-education in 
sexual mores. Imperial rulers held that, as long as they sweltered through the 
promiscuous proximities of settler societies, ‘native’ viciousness and ‘white’ 
virtue had to be segregated: the latter praised and protected, the former policed 
and kept subjected.
Section 377 was, and is, a model law in more ways than one. It was a 
colonial attempt to set standards of behaviour, both to reform the colonised 
and to protect the colonisers against moral lapses. It was also the first colonial 
‘sodomy law’ integrated into a penal code – and it became a model anti-
sodomy law for countries far beyond India, Malaysia, and Uganda. Its influence 
stretched across Asia, the Pacific islands, and Africa, almost everywhere the 
3 An exact number is hard to calculate. Almost none of these laws mention 
‘homosexuality’ (a term only coined in 1869) or homosexual acts; the terminology 
differs between legal systems and (as the discussion of the original meanings of 
‘sodomy’ in chapter II below shows) is sometimes difficult to interpret. For instance, 
Egypt is often excused from lists because its law punishes the ‘habitual practice 
of debauchery [fujur]’, even though domestic jurisprudence since the 1970s has 
established that this term refers to consensual sex between men. The best reference 
work on the subject is Ottosson (2008), 
4 The principle that criminalising consensual same-sex sexual conduct violates basic 
human rights was laid down by the UN Human Rights Committee – which 
interprets and monitors compliance with the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) – in the 1994 case of Toonen v. Australia. The Committee 
found that sexual orientation is a status protected against discrimination under 
articles 2 and 26 of the ICCPR.
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British imperial flag flew.
In Asia and the Pacific, colonies and countries that inherited versions 
of that British law were: Australia, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Brunei, Fiji, 
Hong Kong, India, Kiribati, Malaysia, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Myanmar (Burma), Nauru, New Zealand, Pakistan, Papua New 
Guinea, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Tonga, Tuvalu, and 
Western Samoa.
In Africa, countries that inherited versions were: Botswana, Gambia, 
Ghana,5 Kenya, Lesotho, Malawi, Mauritius, Nigeria, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Somalia, Swaziland, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zambia, and 
Zimbabwe.6
Among these, only New Zealand (in 1986), Australia (state by state and 
territory by territory), Hong Kong (in 1990, before the colony was returned to 
China), and Fiji (by a 2005 high court decision) have put the legacy, and the 
sodomy law, behind them.
Other colonial powers had far less impact in spreading so-called sodomy 
laws. France decriminalised consensual homosexual conduct in 1791.7 (It did, 
5 The Ghanaian code differs from other British-derived Penal Codes in Africa in that 
consensual ‘buggery’, while a crime, is defined only as a misdemeanor. Ghanaian 
law does not derive directly from the Indian Penal Code (or the Queensland Penal 
Code) – as do most other British-African codes, as explained below. Its ancestor 
was a draft prepared for Jamaica by the liberal British jurist R.S. Wright, who was 
heavily influenced by the libertarian ideals of the philosopher John Stuart Mill. 
(Mill famously wrote that ‘the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent 
harm to others’ (Mill 1974, p. 68). Wright’s draft code was never applied in Jamaica 
but became the basis for Ghanaian law (Friedland 1981).
6 South Africa, although taken over by the British in 1806, retained the Netherlands’ 
common law, known as ‘Roman-Dutch’ – which also criminalised ‘sodomy’. This 
common-law offence was finally struck down by the Constitutional Court of the 
post-apartheid country in 1998. (The Netherlands itself decriminalised sodomy in 
1809, when Napoleon annexed it. In one of the typical paradoxes of colonial law, 
this was three years too late to affect the Netherlands’ one time African colony, 
which kept Roman-Dutch law in its pre-1806 form and hence retained the crime.) 
Roman-Dutch law came to what is now Namibia when, as the territory of South-
West Africa, it became a South African mandate in the wake of World War I. It 
remains Namibia’s common law, and sodomy is still a crime there. The same is true 
of Zimbabwe, which began its colonial existence as a possession of Cecil Rhodes’ 
Cape Town-based British South Africa Company. However, Roman-Dutch law in 
colonial Rhodesia as well as modern Zimbabwe has been interpreted by judges 
trained in British common law, and the understanding of sexual offences there has 
been heavily affected by the Sec 377 tradition. For a fuller discussion, see Long 
(2003).
7 Napoleon’s armies then brought decriminalisation to the conquered Netherlands, 
and thus to most of its colonies.
SEXUAL ORIENTATION, GENDER IDENTITY AND HUMAN RIGHTS88
however, impose sodomy laws on some French colonies as means of social 
control, and versions of these survive in countries such as Benin, Cameroon 
and Senegal.) Germany’s notorious Paragraph 175 punished homosexual acts 
between men from Bismarck’s time till after the Nazi period.8 German colonies 
were few, however, and the legal traces of its presence evanescent.9
This report does not pretend to be a comprehensive review of ‘sodomy’ 
and European colonial law. It concentrates on the British experience because 
of the breadth and endurance of its impact. Nor does this report try to look at 
the career of ‘sodomy’ and law in all the British colonies. For clarity, it focuses 
on the descendants of India’s Section 377. (Britain’s Caribbean possessions 
received the criminalisation of ‘buggery’ in British law, but by a different 
process relatively unaffected by the Indian example. They are not discussed 
here: Human Rights Watch 2004a.)
As Britain tottered towards the terminal days of its imperial power, an 
official recommendation by a set of legal experts – the famous Wolfenden 
Report of 1957 – urged that ‘homosexual behaviour between consenting adults 
in private should no longer be a criminal offence’. The report said:
The law’s function is to preserve public order and decency, to protect 
the citizen from what is offensive or injurious, and to provide sufficient 
safeguards against exploitation and corruption of others ... It is not, 
in our view, the function of the law to intervene in the private life 
of citizens, or to seek to enforce any particular pattern of behaviour. 
(Committee on Homosexual Offences and Prostitution 1963)
England and Wales decriminalised most consensual homosexual conduct 
in 1967.10 That came too late for most of Britain’s colonies, though. When 
they won independence in the 1950s and 1960s, they did so with the sodomy 
laws still in place.
Few of those independent states have undertaken repeal since then. This flies 
in the face of a growing body of international human rights law and precedents 
demanding that they do so. They disregard, too, the example of formerly 
colonised states like Ecuador, Fiji and South Africa that have actually enshrined 
protections for equality based on sexual orientation in their constitutions.
Still more striking is how judges, public figures, and political leaders have, 
in recent decades, defended those laws as citadels of nationhood and cultural 
authenticity. Homosexuality, they now claim, comes from the colonising west. 
They forget the west brought in the first laws enabling governments to forbid 
and repress it.
[…]
8 East Germany eliminated it in 1957 and West Germany in 1969.
9 Most of its colonies passed to Britain, France, or Belgium after the First World War.
10 Scotland followed in 1980, and Northern Ireland in 1982.
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Addressing the sodomy law in 1983, India’s Supreme Court proudly declared 
that ‘neither the notions of permissive society nor the fact that in some countries 
homosexuality has ceased to be an offence has influenced our thinking’. (Fazal 
Rab Choudhary v. State of Bihar 1983, p. 323) 
[…]
Opponents of change have mounted the same argument elsewhere. While 
Hong Kong was still a British colony, its authorities fought Wolfenden-like law 
reforms (Petersen 1997). Commissions deputed to investigate the issue heard 
opinions such as ‘Homosexuality may be very common in Britain, but it is 
definitely not common in Hong Kong. Even if it is, it is still wrong to legalise 
activities that are in clear breach of our morals’.11 Only in 1990, after long 
advocacy by the LGBT community, did the colony decriminalise consensual 
homosexual sex.12
After fiery debate, Singapore’s government refused to rid itself of its colonial 
law against homosexual conduct in 2007. The supporters of this position cited 
the ‘communal cohesiveness’ that the British statute supposedly defended.13 
A petition to the prime minister called the law, forced on the colony decades 
before, ‘a reflection of the sentiments of the majority of society … Repealing 
[it] is a vehicle to force homosexuality on a conservative population that is 
not ready for homosexuality’. (Keep377a.com 2008). In November 2001, the 
then prime minister of neighbouring Malaysia, who had encouraged Anwar 
Ibrahim’s first ‘sodomy’ trial, blamed homosexuality on the former colonial 
power: ‘The British people accept homosexual [government] ministers,’ he 
said. ‘But if they ever come here bringing their boyfriend along, we will throw 
them out. We will not accept them’. (Human Rights Watch 2002a, ‘Lesbian, 
Gay, Bisexual and Transgender Rights’ p. 684).
Extreme and extraordinary, however, have been the law’s defences from 
sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe’s Robert Mugabe launched the long ferocity in 
the early 1990s, vilifying lesbians and gays as ‘un-African’ and ‘worse than dogs 
and pigs’. ‘We are against this homosexuality and we as chiefs in Zimbabwe 
should fight against such Western practices and respect our culture,’ he berated 
crowds (quoted in Human Rights Watch/International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission 2003, p. 23). President Daniel Arap Moi of Kenya 
blasted homosexuality as ‘against African tradition and biblical teachings. We 
11 Submission from General Association of Kowloon District Association (quoted 
in The Law Reform Commission of Hong Kong 1982), (The Law Reform 
Commission, however, supported the Wolfenden principles). 
12 It however retained a discriminatory age of consent – 14 for heterosexual sex, 21 for 
sex between men – and a draconian punishment of imprisonment up to life for gay 
men who broke it, as against five years for heterosexuals. This was only overturned 
in court in 2006.
13 Mohammed Aidil in Juris Illuminae (2007).
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will not shy away from warning Kenyans against the dangers of the scourge’ 
(Sipho and Otieno 1999). In Zambia, a government spokesman proclaimed 
in 1998 that it was ‘un-African and an abomination to society which would 
cause moral decay’; the vice-president warned that ‘if anybody promotes gay 
rights after this statement the law will take its course. We need to protect public 
morality’ (quoted in Human Rights Watch/International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission 2003, p. 39).
Some reasoned voices spoke up. Nelson Mandela, steering a country proud 
of its human rights reforms, told a gathering of southern African leaders that 
homosexuality was not ‘un-African’, but ‘just another form of sexuality that 
has been suppressed for years … Homosexuality is something we are living 
with’ (Sipho and Otieno, 1999). Over the years, though, the desperate defence 
of western mores in indigenous clothing grew more enraged, and influential. 
Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo perorated to African Bishops in 2004 
that ‘homosexual practice’ was ‘clearly un-Biblical, unnatural, and definitely 
un-African’. A Nigerian columnist echoed him, claiming those who ‘come in 
the garb of human rights advocates’ are ‘rationalising and glamorising sexual 
perversion, alias homosexuality and lesbianism … The urgent task now is to put 
up the barricades against this invading army of cultural and moral renegades 
before they overwhelm us’ (Olawunmi 2004).
From Singapore to Nigeria, much of this fierce opposition stemmed 
from Christian churches – themselves, of course, hardly homegrown in their 
origins. Archbishop Peter Akinola, head of the Anglican Church of Nigeria, 
has threatened to split his global denomination over some Western churches’ 
acceptance of lesbians and gays. He acknowledges that the missionaries who 
converted much of Africa in colonial days ‘hardly saw anything valid in our 
culture, in our way of life’ (Timberg 2005). Yet he also interprets the most 
stringent moral anathemas of the missionaries’ faith, along with an imported 
law against homosexuality, as essential bulwarks of true African identity.
But the embrace of an alien legal legacy is founded on falsehood. This report 
documents how it damages lives and distorts the truth. Sodomy laws throughout 
Asia and sub-Saharan Africa have consistently been colonial impositions. No 
‘native’ ever participated in their making. Colonisers saw indigenous cultures 
as sexually corrupt. A bent towards homosexuality supposedly formed part of 
their corruption. Where pre-colonial peoples had been permissive, sodomy 
laws would cure them – and defend their new, white masters against moral 
contagion.
Chapter ll of the full report traces the history of Britain’s law on ‘sodomy’, or 
‘buggery’, from its medieval origins to the 19th-century attempt to rationalise 
the chaos of common law. The draft Indian Penal Code, the first experiment 
in producing a criminal code anywhere in the Empire, was a test of how 
systematising law would work. Colonial officials codified sodomy as a criminal 
offence – and refined its meaning – in the process of writing comprehensive 
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codes. This began in India, and travelled from Nigeria to the Pacific in the 
imperial bureaucrat’s baggage.
[…]
Chapter lV [of this report] traces how courts, under colonialism and in the 
newly independent states, interpreted the vague language laid down in the 
colonial codes. Key themes emerge.
•	 First, judges tried to bring an ever wider range of sexual acts within 
the laws’ punitive reach: descending, while doing it, into almost- 
comical obsessions with orifice and organ, desire and detail.
[…]
•	 British provisions on ‘gross indecency’ gave police opportunities 
to arrest people on the basis of suspicion or appearance. And they 
were an opening for governments looking to criminalise sex between 
women as well.
Chapter V [of this report] concludes by looking at the actual effects of 
sodomy laws in these countries. They do not aim just at punishing acts. They 
post broad moral proclamations that certain kinds of people, singled out by 
presumption and prejudice, are less than citizens – or less than human.
Eliminating these laws is a human rights obligation. It means freeing part 
of the population from violence and fear. It also means, though, emancipating 
post-colonial legal systems themselves from imported, autocratically imposed, 
and artificial inequalities.
II. ‘Sodomy’, colonialism and codification
The laws that the Europeans brought dragged a long prehistory behind them. 
The first recorded mentions of ‘sodomy’ in English law date back to two 
medieval treatises called Fleta and Britton. They suggest how strictures on sex 
were connected to Christian Europe’s other consuming anxieties.14
Fleta required that ‘Apostate Christians, sorcerers, and the like should be 
drawn and burnt. Those who have connections with Jews and Jewesses or are 
guilty of bestiality or sodomy shall be buried alive in the ground, provided they 
be taken in the act and convicted by lawful and open testimony’ (quoted in 
Moran 1996, p. 213, n. 2). Britton, meanwhile, ordered a sentence of burning 
upon ‘sorcerers, sorceresses, renegades, sodomists, and heretics publicly 
convicted’ (quoted in Bailey 1955, p. 86. See also Goodrich 1976). Both 
14 Fleta, seu Commentarius Juris Anglicani, was a Latin survey of English law produced 
in Edward I’s court in 1290 (allegedly written while the out-of-favor author served 
time in Fleet prison, accounting for its name: Richardson and Sayles 1955). Britton 
was composed somewhat later, and in Norman French (Brunner 1888; Carson 
1914).
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treatises saw ‘sodomy’ as an offence against God. They classed it, though, with 
other offences against ritual and social purity, involving defilement by Jews or 
apostates, the racial or religious Other.
The grab-bag of crimes was telling. It matched medieval law’s treatment 
of ‘sodomy’ elsewhere in Europe. The offence was not limited to sexual acts 
between men, but could include almost any sexual act seen as polluting. In 
some places it encompassed intercourse with Turks and ‘Saracens’ as well as 
Jews (Long 2003, p. 260; see also Greenberg 1988, pp. 274–92). 
In part, this traced to an old strain in Christian theology that held sexual 
pleasure itself to be contaminating, tolerable only to the degree that it furthered 
reproduction (specifically, of Christians).15 More cogently, though, it reflected 
increasing fears in the advancing Middle Ages about pollution and defilement 
across social boundaries. The historian R.I. Moore (1987) finds in the 11th and 
12th centuries the birth of a ‘persecuting society’ in Europe, targeting various 
enemies within – Jews, lepers, heretics, witches, prostitutes, and ‘sodomites’ 
—who threatened purity and carried contamination, and had to be cast out 
and controlled (see also Douglas 2002). Periodic bursts of repression against 
these and other groups characterised European law for centuries to follow. 
‘Sodomy’ was pollution. Punishing it marked out racial and religious identity. 
The urgency British authorities later showed in transplanting ‘sodomy’ laws 
into colonial contexts – even before they were fully codified at home – may 
reflect the legal category’s origins. It was a way of segregating the Christian, 
European self from alien entities that menaced it with infection.
In England, King Henry VIII’s break with the Catholic Church in the 
16th century led to revising much of the country’s common law – simply 
because offences that had formerly been tried in church courts now had to 
be heard in secular ones. Many sexual offences were among them. A 1533 
statute, therefore, reiterated the criminalisation of ‘sodomy’ as a state rather 
than Church concern. Under the name of the ‘detestable and abominable Vice 
of Buggery committed with mankind or beast’, it was punished by death.16 In 
15 Christian precepts on sexual practice and sexual imagination were refined in patristic 
literature between the 1st and 8th centuries AD. The emphasis was on minimising 
pleasure and maximising procreative possibility in sexual activity. All acts of 
intercourse, including heterosexual vaginal intercourse outside the ‘missionary’ 
position, were graded as ‘unnatural’ to the degree that pleasure superseded the 
purely procreative functions of the sexual act (Brundage 1993). 
16 The word ‘buggery’ derived by way of the French ‘bougre’ from the medieval 
Bogomil heresy, which flourished in Bulgaria. Again, sexual and religious (and 
racial) ‘deviance’ were intimately associated (Bailey 1955, pp. 147–49; Hyde 1970). 
The law was repealed 20 years later with the return of Catholicism under Queen 
Mary, as sexual offences moved back to the jurisdiction of ecclesiastical courts; it 
was re-enacted under the Protestant Queen Elizabeth I in 1563. See also Kenneth 
Borris (2004).
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one form or another, this law persisted until 1861. The last known execution 
for ‘buggery’ in England was in 1836 (Hyde 1970, p. 142).
The sense of the mysterious, polluting power of ‘sodomy’ or ‘buggery’ 
complicated the prosaic legal task of coming up with definitions. Precision was 
dangerous because it flirted with contamination. The jurist Edward Coke, in his 
17th-century compilation of English law, wrote that ‘Buggery is a detestable, 
and abominable sin, amongst Christians not to be named’. He stressed the 
foreign derivation of the term —– ‘an Italian word’ – as well as the act itself: 
‘It was complained of in Parliament, that the Lumbards had brought into the 
realm the shamefull sin of sodomy, that is not to be named’. He nonetheless 
named it as acts ‘committed by carnal knowledge against the ordinance of the 
Creator, and order of nature, by mankind with mankind, or with brute beast, 
or by womankind with brute beast’ (Coke 1797, Cap. X, ‘Of Buggery, or 
Sodomy’, p. 58). Coke specified that anal sex between two men or a man and 
a woman, along with bestiality, were comprised by the term.
Describing ‘sodomy’ precisely was risky, to be avoided. In an 1842 British 
court case that involved a man accused of committing ‘nasty, wicked, filthy, 
lewd, beastly, unnatural and sodomitical practices’ in the vicinity of Kensington 
Gardens, the defence objected that the adjectives gave no indication of what 
the crime actually was.17 The vagueness became more an issue as, in the 19th 
century, reformers set about codifying and imposing order on the chaos of 
British common law and statute law. The Offences Against the Person Act in 
1861 consolidated the bulk of laws on physical offences and acts of violence 
into one ‘modern’, streamlined statute – still the basis for most British law 
of physical assault. It included the offence of (consensual and nonviolent) 
‘buggery’, dropping the death penalty for a prison term of ten years to life.
Less well known is that codifying sexual offences began far earlier, in 1825, 
when the mandate to devise law for the Indian colony was handed to the 
politician and historian Thomas Babington Macaulay. Macaulay chaired the 
first Law Commission of India and was the main drafter of the Indian Penal 
Code – the first comprehensive codified criminal law produced anywhere in 
the British Empire (Friedland 1992, p. 1172).
[…]
Fears of moral infection from the ‘native’ environment made it urgent to 
insert anti-sodomy provisions in the colonial code. A sub-tradition of British 
imperialist writing warned of widespread homosexuality in the countries 
Britain colonised. The explorer Richard Burton, for instance, postulated a 
17 The judges agreed that the invective in the indictment was unspecific. They 
concluded, however, that simply adding the term ‘buggery’ would have the effect of 
‘shewing the intention implied by the epithets’. R v. Rowed (cited in Moran 1996, 
pp. 38 ff.)
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‘Sotadic Zone’ stretching around the planet’s midriff from 43 degrees north of 
the equator to 30 south, in which ‘the Vice is popular and endemic … whilst 
the races to the North and South of the limits here defined practice it only 
sporadically amid the opprobrium of their fellows’ (quoted in Aldrich 2003, 
p. 31).18
The European codifiers certainly felt the mission of moral reform – to correct 
and Christianise ‘native’ custom. Yet there was also the need to protect the 
Christians from corruption. Historians have documented how British officials 
feared that soldiers and colonial administrators – particularly those without 
wives at hand – would turn to sodomy in these decadent, hot surroundings. 
Lord Elgin, viceroy of India, warned that British military camps could become 
‘replicas of Sodom and Gomorrah’ as soldiers acquired the ‘special Oriental 
vices’ (quoted in Hyam 1990, p. 116; see also Hyam 1986).
Macaulay finished a draft Indian Penal Code in 1837, though Indian 
resistance and English hesitation meant that an approved version did not come 
into force until 1860. Introducing the text in an 1837 speech, he discussed 
the clauses in detail – except when, reaching his version of the anti-sodomy 
provision, he showed a traditional discomfort that drafters had to speak to such 
distasteful issues:
Clause 361 and 362 relate to an odious class of offences respecting 
which it is desirable that as little as possible should be said … [We] 
are unwilling to insert, either in the text or in the notes, anything 
which could give rise to public discussion on this revolting subject; as 
we are decidedly of opinion that the injury which would be done to 
the morals of the community by such discussion would far more than 
compensate for any benefits which might be derived from legislative 
measures framed with the greatest precision. (Indian Law Commission 
1837, pp. 3990–91)
Despite this, however, Macaulay tried in fact to rationalise the British offence 
of ‘buggery’. All the old vagueness around the term called out for clarification, 
and the colonies were the place to put this into practice. Macaulay came up 
with a broader definition of the violation of the ‘order of nature’, involving 
any kind of offending ‘touch’. But he introduced a new axis of classification, 
according to whether the act was consensual or not – something never relevant 
in the old crime of ‘buggery’. He chose to impose fresh language on India. 
Two clauses pertained to ‘Unnatural Offences’, distinguished by the element 
of consent:
Cl. 361 Whoever, intending to gratify unnatural lust, touches, for that 
purpose, any person, or any animal, or is by his own consent touched 
by any person, for the purpose of gratifying unnatural lust, shall be 
18 Or, as Lord Byron theorised about a similar but heterosexual ‘vice’: ‘What men call 
gallantry, and Gods adultery/Is much more common where the climate’s sultry’. 
Don Juan, Canto I, stanza 63 (Byron 2004).
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punished with imprisonment … for a term which may extend to 
fourteen years and must not be less than two years, and shall also be 
liable to fine.
Cl. 362 Whoever, intending to gratify unnatural lust, touches for that 
purpose any person without that person’s free and intelligent consent, shall 
be punished with imprisonment … for a term which may extend to life 
and must not be less than seven years, and shall also be liable to fine. 
[emphasis added]
The ‘injunction to silence’ (Moran 1996, p. 33) that Coke and other jurists 
had promoted around the vocabulary of ‘sodomy’ continued to be powerful, 
however. When the final draft of the Indian Penal Code came into force in 
1860, the ‘Unnatural Offences’ section was modified. The ultimate, historic 
text – which, in one form or another, influenced or infested much of the 
British Empire – read:
Section 377: Unnatural offences – Whoever voluntarily has carnal 
intercourse against the order of nature with any man, woman or animal 
shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment 
… for a term which may extend to 10 years, and shall be liable to fine.
Explanation – Penetration is sufficient to constitute the carnal 
intercourse necessary to the offence described in this Section.
The reasons for the change remain unclear, but its effects are evident. 
On the one hand, this version went back to the outlines of the old standard 
of ‘buggery’, replacing the reference to ‘touching’ with the criterion of 
‘penetration’. There were still plenty of ambiguities (including the question of 
what had to penetrate what). These in turn let future colonial and post-colonial 
jurists redefine what these provisions actually punished.
On the other hand, the attempt to organise the offence around the axis of 
consent/non-consent was dropped. In principle, stipulating that the act had 
to be ‘voluntary’ meant the victim of forcible ‘carnal intercourse’ could not be 
criminalised. But the other actor received the same punishment, and was guilty 
of the same offence, whether the act was forcible or not. Despite the code’s 
modern pretensions, the provision offered no differing standard of harm based 
on the use of force.
Thus the separate Penal Code provision addressing rape (Section 375) 
remained restricted to a man’s rape of a woman. No distinct criminal offence 
was entailed in a man’s sexual assault on another man; it was simply lumped 
with consensual offences in Section 377. Section 377 also had no separate 
provision or protection prohibiting an adult male from having sexual relations 
with a male child. That offence, too, was contained in 377 without distinction.19
19 Meanwhile, a man who had sexual relations with a girl under ten was guilty of 
statutory rape; the age was raised to 12 in 1891, 14 in 1925 and 16 in 1940 (One 
India 2008). 
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As a result, India – along with other countries from Zambia to Fiji with 
legal systems affected by the Indian Penal Code – was left without laws fully 
covering rape or child protection. To the drafters, the act of ‘sodomy’ itself was 
so horrible that the harm seemed uniform: regardless of the other party’s age, 
and regardless of whether he consented or not. 
[…]
Section 377 was exported to, and modified in other British colonies, and 
reinterpreted by their courts. Two themes emerge. They show again how 
colonial law was a field for exploring the meaning of an old British standard.
•	 By defining ‘carnal knowledge’ in terms of penetration, the Indian 
Penal Code language limited the act and left open the possibility that 
only the penetrating party might be guilty. As the law was applied in 
British colonies in subsequent years, one project was to redefine the 
scope of ‘penetration’ — and ensure the provision would criminalise 
as broad a range of acts, and partners, ‘against the order of nature’ as 
possible.
•	 The absence of the factors of age or of consent in the law meant that 
consensual homosexual conduct was legally indistinguishable from 
rape or pedophilia. Thus the figure of the ‘homosexual’ could easily 
be linked and assimilated – in popular thinking as well as before the 
law – to violent sexual criminals.
[…]
British law at home underwent a further refinement in 1885, during a revision 
of laws on the ‘protection of women, girls [and] the suppression of brothels’. 
Henry Labouchere, a member of Parliament, introduced an amendment so 
unrelated to the debate that it was almost ruled out of order. When finally 
passed, it punished ‘Any male person who in public or private commits or is a 
party to the commission of or procures or attempts to procure the commission 
by any male person of any act of gross indecency with another male person’, 
with two years at hard labor. ‘Gross indecency’ was a broad offence designed 
to include virtually all kinds of non-penetrative sexual acts between two men. 
Unlike the 1861 ‘buggery’ law, the Labouchere Amendment also explicitly 
extended to private acts. The press quickly dubbed it the ‘blackmailer’s charter’. 
Oscar Wilde was convicted under its terms in 1895 (Hyde 1962, pp. 12–13).
Labouchere’s law acknowledged that two men could practice many other 
sexual acts than ‘sodomy’. A society ambitious to extirpate such acts needed 
an express acknowledgement of its power over privacy, and a wider criminal 
framework to punish them.
Labouchere’s provision came too late to be introduced in the Indian Penal 
Code itself. However, subsequent colonial codes incorporated versions of it, 
97HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH REPORT
including codes that derived from the IPC. It appeared in the Sudanese Penal 
Code in 1899, and in the influential penal law of Queensland in the same 
year. Malaysia and Singapore received the gross indecency provision jointly 
through an amendment in 1938.20 Moreover, as explained below, subsequent 
jurisprudence in India (particularly the Khanu judgment) expanded the scope 
of ‘unnatural offences’ to include what would otherwise have been ‘gross 
indecency’ under British law. Further, though Labouchere’s innovation only 
spoke of male-male sex, some governments have made ‘gross indecency’ apply 
to sex between women – by dropping the ‘male’ before ‘person’ (as detailed 
below in chapter IV).
The Indian Penal Code became the model for British colonies’ legal systems 
throughout most of Asia and Africa. Each territory took over the newest 
version, one legal historian writes, ‘improving and bringing them up to date, 
and the resulting product [was] then used as the latest model for an enactment 
elsewhere’ (Morris 1974). The Straits Settlement Law of in 1871, covering 
territory that today encompasses Singapore, Malaysia, and Brunei, effectively 
duplicated the IPC (Chan 2004). Between 1897 and 1902 administrators 
applied the Indian Penal Code in Britain’s African colonies, including 
Kenya and Uganda (Read 1963). Some British residents complained about 
the undemocratic character of the codes. British East Africans, for instance, 
protested a policy of placing ‘white men under laws intended for a coloured 
population despotically governed’ (Morris, 1974, p. 13).
The Sudanese Penal Code of 1899 also adapted the IPC, but shows a 
different strain in codifying ‘unnatural offences’. It reintroduced, uniquely 
among British colonies, the axis of consent and a form of differentiation by 
age. Its version of Section 377 reads:
S. 318 Whoever has carnal intercourse against the order of nature with 
any person without his consent, shall be punished with imprisonment 
for a term which may extend to fourteen years and shall also be liable 
to fine; provided that a consent given by a person below the age of 
sixteen years to such intercourse by his teacher, guardian or any person 
entrusted with his care or education shall not be deemed to be a 
consent within the meaning of this section [emphasis added]. (Gledhill 
1963, p. 443)
20 Sec 377A was introduced into the Singapore Penal Code by Sec 7 of the Penal 
Code (Amendment) Ordinance 1938 (No 12 of 1938). The reason, as stated in 
the Proceedings of the Legislative Council of the Straits Settlements in 1938 was 
to ‘[make] punishable acts of gross indecency between male persons which do not 
amount to an unnatural offence within the meaning of s 377 of the Code’: p. C81, 
April 25, 1938. See microfiche no 672, Straits Settlements Legislative Council, 
Proceedings (SE 102), Vol. 1938 (Central Library Reprographic Dept, National 
University of Singapore).
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Similarly, while the Sudanese code adopted the ‘gross indecency’ provision, it 
only punished it when non-consensual (Gledhill 1963, p. 444, Sec 319). These 
distinctions were lost after independence, however, when in 1991 Sudan’s 
government imposed a shari’a-inspired penal code.21
The Penal Code of the Australian colony of Queensland (QPC) was drafted 
in 1899 by the colony’s chief justice, Sir Samuel Griffith (Friedland 1992, p. 
1177).22 It came into force in 1901 and was the second most influential penal 
code after the IPC, especially in British Africa. The QPC introduced into the 
IPC’s version of ‘unnatural offences’ the category of the ‘passive’ sexual partner 
– the one who ‘permits’. Section 208 read:
Any person who —
(a) has carnal knowledge of any person against the order of nature; or
(b) has carnal knowledge of an animal; or
(c) permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against 
the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for 
fourteen years [emphasis added].
This eliminated one of the ambiguities in the IPC, making clear that both 
partners in the act were criminal. The QPC also widened the ambit beyond 
‘penetration’, by introducing an independent provision for ‘attempts to 
commit unnatural offences’.23 Thus any sexual act or approach not resulting in 
penetration could be called an ‘attempt’.
Outside Australia, the QPC first took root in Papua New Guinea. The 
21 The Sudanese Penal Code of 1991, Sec 148, ‘Sodomy: (1) Any man who inserts his 
penis or its equivalent into a woman‘s or a man‘s anus or permitted another man to 
insert his penis or its equivalent in his anus is said to have committed Sodomy; (2) 
(a) Whoever commits Sodomy shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes 
and he shall also be liable to five years imprisonment; (b) If the offender is convicted 
for the second time he shall be punished with flogging one hundred lashes and 
imprisonment for a term which may not exceed five years. (c) If the offender is 
convicted for the third time he shall be punished with death or life imprisonment’ 
As chapter V discusses below, in a number of countries – Pakistan and Nigeria 
among them – the modern resurgence of supposedly shari’a-influenced or -derived 
laws has not so much revived ‘indigenous’ legal values as further entrenched colonial 
ones. This toxic mix is an important topic in its own right, but beyond the scope of 
this report.
22 It was based on an earlier proposal from 1878.
23 Unnatural offences themselves continued to be defined by penetration, as in Sec 
6: ‘Carnal Knowledge: When the term “carnal knowledge” or the term “carnal 
connection” is used in defining an offence, it is implied that the offence, so far as 
regards that element of it, is complete upon penetration’. However, Sec 2–9 of the 
QPC reads that ‘Any person who attempts to commit any of the crimes defined in 
the last preceding section is guilty of a crime, and is liable to imprisonment with 
hard labor for seven years’.
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chief justice of Northern Nigeria, H.C. Gollan, then decided to adopt it as 
the model for his colony’s penal code, which came into force in 1904. It then 
became the subject of bureaucratic battles between colonial administrators; 
officials in Southern Nigeria were divided between proponents of the QPC and 
supporters of the Indian Penal Code.24 The former finally won out. In 1916, 
two years after Nigeria combined into a single colony, a common criminal code 
based on the QPC was adopted (Morris 1970; see also Adewoye 1977).
That process reveals a point. Despite the claims of modern political leaders 
that anti-sodomy laws represent the values of their independent nations, the 
Queensland Penal Code spread across Africa indifferently to the will of Africans.
The whims, preferences, and power struggles of bureaucrats drove it. After the 
Criminal Code of Nigeria was imposed, colonial officials in East Africa – modern 
Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania – moved gradually to imitate it. A legal historian 
observes that the ‘personal views and prejudices’ of colonial officials, rather than 
any logic or respect for indigenous customs, led to replacing IPC-based codes 
with QPC-based codes in much of the continent (Morris 1974, p. 6).
The versions of ‘unnatural offences’ that spread with the QPC now 
encompassed a variety of acts: they punished a passive partner in sodomy, 
attempts at sodomy, and also ‘gross indecency’. For instance, Uganda’s Penal 
Code provided that:
S. 140: Any person who (a) has carnal knowledge of any person against 
the order of nature; or (b) has carnal knowledge of an animal; or(c) 
permits a male person to have carnal knowledge of him or her against 
the order of nature, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment 
for fourteen years.
S. 141 Any person who attempts to commit any of the offences 
specified in the last preceding section is guilty of a felony and is liable 
to imprisonment for seven years.
S.143 Any male person who, whether in public or private, commits 
any act of gross indecency with another male person, or procures 
another male person to commit any act of gross indecency with him, 
or attempts to procure the commission of any such act by any male 
person with himself or with another male person, whether in public or 
private, is guilty of a felony and is liable to imprisonment for five years.
Nigeria did offer variations from the trend. Its version narrowed ‘carnal 
knowledge’ to exempt sex between ‘a husband and wife’, making clearer what 
it understood by the ‘order of nature’.25 The law zeroed in towards its primary 
24 Broader issues than ‘unnatural offences’ divided supporters of the two codes. The 
QPC was heavily inflected by European civil law, particularly the Italian Penal 
Code, and omitted the common-law requirement of mens rea, or criminal intent.
25 Sec 6: ‘“Unlawful carnal knowledge” means carnal connection which takes place 
otherwise than between husband and wife’. 
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focus on sex between men.26
Three generalisations arise from the confused history of ‘carnal knowledge’ 
in colonial penal codes.
•	 The anti-sodomy provisions that contemporary politicians defend as 
part of indigenous values never drew on local customary law, nor were 
they drafted through a deliberative process. Colonial officers devised 
and imposed them. They saw the sex laws as necessary precisely 
because they viewed local cultures as lax, a haven for ‘unnatural 
offences’.
•	 Colonial authorities continuously grappled with terms and 
definitions, trying to arrive at both adequate language and common 
understandings around ‘unnatural offences. But they did so under the 
shadow of a moral anxiety about the effects of debate, an injunction 
to silence that helped justify autocratic lawmaking with no discussion 
among the ‘subject’ peoples.
•	 Redefinition tended to widen the scope of the law – and to criminalise 
not just sexual acts, but a kind of person.
[…]
IV. Interpreting sodomy laws: the scope expands
Forensic medical exams display the particularity to which the state descends 
when it tries to parse out the specifics and the evidence of sexual acts. The 
story of how courts in the colonial period and beyond interpreted the various 
versions of Section 377 also shows state authorities stuck in morasses of sexual 
detail. Together, they exhibit the logical gymnastics states get into in defining 
the line between permissible and punishable sexual acts – and trying to keep a 
rationale for the distinction.
One distinction that never mattered much, in ‘unnatural offences’, was 
the axis of consent. Most of the surviving jurisprudence under colonialism 
and since independence (what reached the law reports were largely cases on 
26 Later, in 1960, during the waning days of colonial rule, the territory of Northern 
Nigeria chose to have a separate Penal Code, independent of the new country’s 
Federal Criminal Code. It took as a basis the Sudanese Penal Code of 1899, 
ironically based on the IPC, which Northern Nigeria had earlier rejected (Morris 
1970, p. 153). However, the fact that the Sudanese code had decriminalised 
consensual sodomy did not go unnoticed – or unchanged. The Northern Nigeria 
Penal Code reverted back to the old consent-neutral definition from the Indian 
Penal Code. To multiply confusion, though, the drafters neglected to make the 
same change to the ‘gross indecency’ provision, which remained applicable only to 
non-consensual activities (Gledhill 1963, p. 444).
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appeal, undoubtedly representing only a fraction of convictions) deals with 
charges of non-consensual sodomy. Nearly universally – as one Zimbabwean 
legal expert writes – the fact that ‘an assault (possibly violent) has taken place is 
of secondary importance’ to the court (Phillips 1999, p. 193). The law’s silence 
on consent translates into judges’ indifference to the victim. It also reaffirms 
that ‘the non-existence of a victim’, where there was consent, is no hindrance 
to prosecution (Phillips 1999, p. 193). 
This chapter will show:
•	 First, investigating the details of sexual acts led to further expanding 
the scope of acts covered by Section 377. The law came to recognise 
broader categories of ‘sexual perversion’, and while that extended into 
acts committed by heterosexual couples, the ‘sodomite’ or ‘catamite’ 
or ‘homosexual’ was at the centre of its meaning.
[…]
•	 British law never punished sex between women – and hence British 
colonialism never imported criminal penalties for it. However, the 
breadth of the British ‘gross indecency’ provision has given states an 
opening to penalise lesbians as well.
Jurisprudence: from ‘crimes against nature’ to communal values
In 1930s India, police captured a young man called Ratansi while he and 
another man were trying to have sex. In court, Ratansi did not deny it. The 
furious judge called him a ‘despicable specimen of humanity’, addicted to 
the ‘vice of a catamite’ on his own admission (Noshirwan v. Emperor 1934, 
p. 206). It was not just the act in isolation that appalled the court: it was the 
contemptible class of person. Yet the judge could not punish the two accused: 
they were caught before they could finish the act. A gap yawned between his 
repulsion at the arrested men, and the evidentiary limits his understanding of 
the statute demanded. Conviction required penetration, and physical or other 
proof.
Much of the later jurisprudence around Section 377, in the many places 
where it was enforced, would try to close that gap: to re-draw the sexual map 
of ‘immorality’ and cram a sufficiently wide range of acts within the criminal 
compass, so that no ‘despicable specimen of humanity’ would be acquitted. 
What counted as ‘unnatural’ and, as one commentator observes, ‘what counted 
as penetration continued to be an ongoing, arbitrary, and unsystematic 
discussion’ across courts and countries (Bhaskaran 2002, p. 20).
‘Carnal intercourse against the order of nature’ had never been precisely 
defined. One of the first Indian cases to reach the law reports on appeal, 
though, reflected what was probably the usual judicial understanding. The 
phrase meant anal sex, since ‘the act must be in that part where sodomy is 
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usually committed’. (Government v. Bapoji Bhatt 1884, p. 280) 27
The 1925 Indian case of Khanu v. Emperor (1925, p. 286) took the first step 
towards redrawing the boundaries of Section 377. It became, for a long time, 
the guiding judgment on interpreting 377 through British colonies in South 
Asia, East Asia, and East Africa. The case involved forcible oral sex between an 
adult male and a minor. The non-consensual nature of the act played no role in 
the appeals decision. The only question that concerned the court was whether 
oral sex was an unnatural carnal offence under Section 377.
Khanu said yes. 377 was not limited to anal sex (Khanu v. Emperor 1925, p. 
286). It cited two lines of reasoning.
The first defined the order of nature in sex as ‘the possibility of conception of 
human beings’: oral sex was legally like anal sex in that it was not reproductive. 
The colonial court’s complete divorce from the Indian context – its reliance on 
purely European traditions of sexual propriety, which conflated nature with 
procreation – could not have been clearer. Nor did the court consider that 
other forms of penetrative sex (for instance, using birth control) also foreclosed 
the ‘possibility of conception’. 28
The second line of thinking redefined penetration. The court defined 
‘carnal intercourse’ as 
a temporary visitation to one organism by a member of the other 
organism, for certain clearly defined and limited objects. The primary 
object of the visiting organism is to obtain euphoria by means of a 
detente of the nerves consequent on the sexual crisis. But there is no 
intercourse unless the visiting member is enveloped at least partially 
by the visited organism, for intercourse connotes reciprocity (Khanu v. 
Emperor 1925, p. 286).
As long as there is an orifice (the mouth) to enclose the ‘visiting member’, 
there can be carnal intercourse. When it cannot lead to procreation, there is an 
‘unnatural offence’ (Khanu v. Emperor 1925, p. 286).29
Khanu opened the way to bringing other acts under the scope of Section 
377. For example, a 1961 case from East Pakistan (present-day Bangladesh) 
found that the identical provision in the Pakistan Penal Code criminalised 
27 The appellant was charged under Sec 377 on allegations of oral sex with a minor. 
28 At the same time the colonial court in Khanu defined ‘unnatural’ sex as non-
procreative sex, contraception was legal in Britain. Marie Stopes opened Britain’s 
first family planning clinic in 1921, four years before Khanu. Birth control had 
never been criminalised in the home country, though distributing information on 
contraception risked obscenity charges through the 19th century (Brandser 2004).
29 The Khanu court still found oral sex ‘less pernicious than the sin of Sodom’. Its 
peculiar reasons were that ‘It cannot be practiced on persons who are unwilling. It 
is not common and can never be so’ – and, most notably, ‘it cannot produce the 
physical changes which the other vice produces’.
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what it called ‘thigh sex’ (Muhammad Ali v. The State 1961, p. 447). The court 
followed the penetration-specific definition of Khanu and held that ‘the entry 
of the male organ of the accused into the artificial cavity between the thighs 
of [the other partner] would mean penetration and would amount to carnal 
intercourse’.
The post-independence Indian case of Lohana Vasantlal also followed and 
modified the Khanu decision (Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. The State 1968, 
p. 252). On the facts, much like Khanu, it involved three men who forced an 
underage boy to have anal and oral sex with them. However, the judgment 
neglects the injury caused to the boy who was forced to undergo the sexual act: 
there is no discussion of coercion. Instead the court concentrated on including 
oral sex under 377. As with other appealed cases involving coerced sex, the 
court’s reasoning would apply seamlessly to consensual acts.
Lohana Vasantlal agreed with Khanu in finding oral sex unnatural: the 
‘orifice of the mouth is not according to nature meant for sexual or carnal 
intercourse’ (Lohana Vasantlal Devchand v. The State 1968, p. 252). The court 
applied two tests. Its main source, tellingly, came from the UK: the eminent 
British sexologist Havelock Ellis. Following him, it argued that oral sex might 
be permissible if it was part of foreplay leading to ‘natural’ (vaginal) sex: ‘If 
the stage of the aforesaid act was for stimulating the sex urge, it may be urged 
that it was only a prelude to carnal intercourse’(ibid). However, again citing 
Ellis, it found that when forms of sex play cease being ‘aids to tumescence’ 
and ‘replace the desire of coitus’, then ‘They became deviations … and thus 
liable to be termed “perversions”’(ibid.). The Lohana court also developed an 
‘imitative test’ for sex acts. For example, oral sex imitated anal sex in terms of 
penetration, orifice, enclosure and sexual pleasure. Therefore it could also be 
punished under Section 377.
K. Govindan, a 1969 Indian case, used the ‘imitative test’ from Lohana to 
arrive at the same conclusion as the court in former East Pakistan on ‘thigh 
sex’: if ‘the male organ is “inserted” or “thrust” between the thighs, there is 
“penetration” to constitute unnatural offence’ (State of Kerala v. K. Govindan 
1969, p. 20). 
The judge in Khanu had said, ‘I doubt if mutual cheirourgia would be’ a 
form of ‘carnal intercourse’ – turning to Greek to dredge up a euphemism for 
masturbation (Khanu v. Emperor 1925, p. 286).30 However, a court moved 
mutual masturbation under the ambit of Section 377 in the Indian case of 
Brother John Antony v. State31 (1992, p. 1352). In this case, again, allegations 
of coercion were of no interest to the court. The judgment instead delves into 
the ‘sexually perverse’, analysing and analogising practices like ‘tribadism’, 
30 Cheirourgia, in Greek, means ‘work done by hands’. 
31 The case involved charges of oral sex and mutual masturbation against a boarding 
school teacher.
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‘bestiality’, ‘masochism’, ‘fetishism’, ‘exhibitionism’ and ‘sadism’ (ibid. p. 1353). 
Using the imitative test, it concluded that mutual masturbation falls within 
377, as ‘the male organ of the petitioner is said to be held tight by the hands of 
the victims, creating an orifice-like thing for manipulation and movement of 
the penis by way of insertion and withdrawal’ (ibid).
In Singapore, two cases from the 1990s – PP v. Tan Kuan Meng (1996, p. 
16) and PP v. Kwan Kwong Weng (1997, p. 697) – followed the distinction 
(between ‘prelude to’ and ‘substitute for’ the act of ‘natural’ sex) that Lohana 
had laid down. Each of these 377 trials involved a woman’s allegation that a 
man had forced her to have oral sex. The court in Kwan Kwong Weng defined the 
crime as ‘fellatio between a man and woman, whether the woman consented or 
not, which was totally irrelevant’ (ibid. para 12).
Kwan Kwong Weng weighed current mores among heterosexuals, taking 
note of ‘statistical evidence … of these forms of oral sex being practised in 
Singapore. We cannot shut our minds to it’ (ibid. para 30). The court granted 
‘it is a fact of life that foreplay occurs before copulation’. And it held that ‘when 
couples engaged in consensual sexual intercourse willingly indulge in fellatio 
and cunnilingus as a stimulant to their respective sexual urges, neither act can 
be considered to be against the order of nature. In every other instance the act 
... will be ... punishable’ (ibid. para 28).
Heterosexual oral sex was thus like a middling restaurant in the motorists’ 
guide: worth a detour, but never, ever deserving a journey in itself. Heterosexuals, 
though, had a legal leeway for oral sex that was denied to homosexuals. They 
could claim that ‘natural’, vaginal sex was somewhere off in distant view, the 
long-planned destination after a diversion to a different orifice.
However, both Lohana and Kwan Kwong Weng subtly undermined the 
foundations of the old Khanu ruling, by quietly discarding the ‘procreation’ 
justification. The judge in Kwan Kwong Weng accepted implicitly (as the 
statistics before the Singapore court suggested) that people have sex for pleasure 
in and of itself – a major judicial concession.
This opened again the question: how confidently can the law distinguish 
between ‘natural’ and ‘unnatural’? The lack of a self-evident standard in 
the Kwan Kwong Weng case ultimately led to a renewed push in Singapore 
for reforming the colonial-era provision. That push was given force by more 
prosecutions of heterosexuals for oral sex. In 2004, Singapore courts sentenced 
a former policeman to two years in prison for having oral sex with a teenage 
girl.32 One judge spoke of ‘certain offences that are so repulsive in Asian culture 
… There are countries where you can go and suck away for all you are worth. 
[…] But this is Asia’ (quoted in Baker 2004).
32 First press accounts suggested that she was 16, above the legal age of consent for 
(vaginal) sex, and had consented. Later reports, however, suggested she was 15. 
‘Singapore Reviews Oral Sex Law’, BBC News, January 6, 2004.
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‘Asia’ was not as conservative as the judge thought. Criminalising homosexual 
acts was one thing; criminalising heterosexual acts by now sparked outrage. 
Press and public opinion rebelled at the presumption that straight ‘sucking’ was 
alien to Singapore. Under pressure, the government launched a review of the 
law. Officials said from the beginning it would aim to decriminalise consensual 
oral sex between men and women, but leave all oral sex between men banned 
(Chan 2004).
That was what happened. The review eventually turned into a revision of 
the entire Penal Code; but homosexual conduct was the only real dispute. The 
government willingly discarded the ‘carnal intercourse’ provision of the law, 
which included heterosexual conduct. A battle line formed, though, at Section 
377A –the old Labouchere Amendment text, criminalising ‘gross indecency’ 
between men. Human rights activists launched a petition to eliminate the ban 
on consensual homosexual conduct, as well as liberating heterosexuals; it gained 
thousands of signatures. LGBT advocates courageously joined in public debate. 
Yet in 2007, the government at last determined to cling to Section 377A.
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong voiced personal sympathy for gay citizens: 
‘We … do not want them to leave Singapore to go to more congenial places 
to live’. But, he added, ‘homosexuals should not set the tone for Singapore 
society’:
Singapore is basically a conservative society. The family is the basic 
building block of our society. It has been so and, by policy, we have 
reinforced this and we want to keep it so. And by ‘family’ in Singapore, 
we mean one man one woman, marrying, having children and 
bringing up children within that framework of a stable family unit 
(Yawningbread.org 2007a).
Despite the reference to procreation, one thing was clear in the debate: the 
criterion of ‘nature’ had basically been thrown out the window. If heterosexual 
oral sex could be legally seen as natural in itself – despite its lack of any 
connection to ‘having children’ – there was no coherent basis for calling oral 
sex between two men ‘unnatural’.33 
[…]
Even the most virulent defenders of Section 377A argued not by appealing to 
the ‘natural’, but by theorising about community values. One parliamentarian 
declaimed:
33 Lee Kuan Yew, the powerful former prime minister, made the shift from nature-based 
to culture-based arguments explicit, telling supporters: ‘You take this business of 
homosexuality. It raises tempers all over the world, and even in America. If in fact it 
is true – and I have asked doctors this – that you are genetically born a homosexual 
because that’s the nature of the genetic random transmission of genes, you can’t help 
it. So why should we criminalise it? But’, he went on, ‘there’s such a strong inhibition 
in all societies … ’ Straits Time, April 23, 2007 (Yawningbread.com, 2007b).
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If we seek to copy the sexual libertine ethos of the wild wild West, then 
repealing s377A is progressive. But that is not our final destination. The 
onus is on those seeking repeal to prove this will not harm society … We 
have no need of foreign or neo-colonial moral imperialism in matters 
of fundamental morality. Heterosexual sodomy unlike homosexual 
sodomy does not undermine the understanding of heterosexuality as 
the preferred social norm (The Online Citizen 2007).34
Yet relying on a ‘preferred social norm’ actually undermined the original 
foundations of the law, based on belief that ‘sodomy’ was ‘against the order 
of nature’, not just the order of a particular society. And – most importantly 
– foreign ‘moral imperialism in matters of fundamental morality’ was exactly 
what had brought the law to Singapore in the first place.
The Singapore story tears off the mask. It shows that Section 377’s central 
focus, despite the heterosexual acts it had always punished, lay in eliminating 
homosexual conduct. It also shows, though, how tenuous the case for that 
purpose had become. ‘Nature’ was no longer a credible justification. The mores 
of particular societies were all that was left. As a Malaysian court had declared 
in 1979 (addressing a wife’s claim that her husband had sexual relations 
with other men): ‘Such despicable conduct though permitted among some 
Westerners should not be allowed to corrupt the community‘s way of life’ (Lim 
Hui Lian v. CM Huddlestan 1979, p. 134).
[…]
Elsewhere too, though, invoking a vague set of ‘national’ or ‘cultural’ norms 
became the main defence of the colonial-era sodomy laws. […] Now it was the 
west that threatened to corrupt indigenous standards.
A 1999 verdict from Zambia indicates how sour and weak the argument 
around ‘nature’ had turned, and at the same time how unconvincing the appeal 
to popular beliefs could be. The judge in a local court faced with charges that 
a man had oral sex with other men, approached them through a muddle of 
theology and anatomy:
Surely the mouth is not the same as a vagina. God gave specific 
functions to each organ … The mouth is for eating etc., and the vagina 
is for both sex and urinating. … Accused couldn’t change God’s desire. 
For behaving in the way he did, he implied God made a mistake [in] 
his distribution of functions.
Yet the conclusive factor for the judge, as he studied the accusation under 
a British law brought to Zambian territory by colonial invaders less than a 
hundred years before, was: ‘Accused’s behavior is alien to the African custom’ 
(Human Rights Watch/IGLHRC, 2003, pp. 91–92).
34 She also warned ominously, ‘To those who say that 377A penalises only gays not 
lesbians, note there have been calls to criminalise lesbianism too’.
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[…]
‘Gross Indecency’ and Criminalising Lesbians
 ‘Gross indecency’ in British-derived penal codes is highly elastic. A Singapore 
court has stated its meaning depends ‘on what would be considered grossly 
indecent by any right-thinking member of the public’ (NG Huat v. PP 1995, 
p. 783).35 Just slightly more specifically, a 1998 amendment to the Tanzanian 
Penal Code clarified that gross indecency included any act that ‘falls short 
of actual intercourse and may include masturbation and indecent behaviour 
without any physical contact’.36 Thus two men kissing, holding hands, sleeping 
together, or conceivably even looking at one another with sexual intent, could 
break the law.
On the one hand, ‘gross indecency’, like its British ancestor the Labouchere 
Amendment, only targets acts between men – as opposed to ‘carnal knowledge’, 
which could, at least as originally interpreted, also include heterosexual acts. 
On the other, unlike ‘carnal knowledge’, gross indecency does not entail 
penetration. In practice it was used to root out men who have sex with men 
who were caught in non-sexual circumstances, allowing arrests wherever they 
gathered or met – parks and railway stations, bathhouses and bars, and private 
homes and spaces. And unlike ‘carnal knowledge’, the absence of penetration 
meant a lower standard of proof. No forensic tests or flower-shaped anuses 
were needed.
The usefulness of ‘gross indecency’ in convicting men for homosexual 
conduct comes clear in the 1946 Singapore case of Captain Marr (Rex v. 
Captain Douglas Marr, p. 77). A naval officer faced charges of committing 
gross indecency with an Indian man. There were no witnesses, but police found 
the Indian’s shirt in the captain’s room. Such circumstantial evidence persuaded 
the court to convict.
The authorities are free to infer ‘gross indecency’ from any suspicious 
activity. The term is insidious, a legal bridge between ‘unnatural’ sexual acts 
and the associated identity of a certain kind of person: the ‘homosexual’ as a 
criminal offender. Homosexuality becomes a crime of the ‘personal condition’. 
This broader understanding of ‘unnatural acts’ permits state and police 
harassment on a wider scale. A homosexual need not be caught in the act: 
presumptions fed by prejudice, or stereotypes of attire, manner, or association, 
35 An X-ray technician was charged with ‘gross indecency’ for allegedly touching the 
chest, nipples and buttocks of a patient.
36 Section 3 of the Sexual Offences Special Provisions Act (Act no. 4 of 1998), passed 
by the Parliament of the United Republic of Tanzania, amended several provisions 
relating to sexual offences of the Tanzanian Penal Code, including the definition of 
gross indecency. 
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are enough (Hoyle v. Regiman 1957). 37
‘Gross indecency’ has been used to extend criminal penalties to sex between 
women. Lesbian sex had never been expressly punished in English law. The 
colonial court in Khanu excluded it from ‘carnal knowledge’ because a woman 
lacked a penis. A recent Ugandan commentary explains that ‘women who 
perform sexual acts on each other are not caught by the current law because they 
do not possess a sexual organ with which to penetrate each other’. (Tibatemwa-
Ekirikubinza 2005, p. 97). Non-penetrative sex is not ‘real’ sex (Tamale 2003).
Between men, however, it was seen as something sex-like enough to be 
‘grossly indecent’. There was no reason the same logic could not extend to 
women. Some modern governments did want lesbian acts and identities 
moved under the criminal law. They found their chance through public 
debate about reforming rape laws. In the late 1980s the Malaysian women’s 
movement campaigned for a new, gender-neutral definition of rape, as well as 
for criminalising marital rape (Beng Hui 2006). Partially in response to their 
lobbying, the legislature in 1989 moved to amend the Penal Code.38
In the end, however, legislators ignored the calls to modernise law on rape, 
and instead turned their scrutiny to Section 377. Their comprehensive re-write 
divided the Section into five different parts, while broadening its meaning and 
reach more than ever before. Their excuse? They could make rape effectively 
gender-neutral by adding a new crime of non-consensual ‘carnal intercourse 
against the order of nature’.39 The new provision also offered limited protection 
37 A 1957 Ugandan case showed how stereotype and presumption – about relations 
between the races, as well as sex itself – could also serve as conclusive evidence in 
cases of ‘sodomy’. A British officer had given a ‘native’ herdsman one shilling and 
some sugar as gifts. The unusualness of this ‘special favor’ across the power divide 
created a presumption of sodomy, leading to the officer’s arrest (Hoyle v. Regiman 
1957).
38 Criminal Code (Amendment) Act 1989 (Act A727).
39 The punishment – five to 20 years’ imprisonment – remained almost the same as for 
consensual homosexual acts, but was equivalent to the punishment for a man’s rape 
of a woman: 377A.Carnal intercourse against the order of nature. Any person who 
has sexual connection with another person by the introduction of the penis into 
the anus or mouth of the other person is said to commit carnal intercourse against 
the order of nature. Explanation: Penetration is sufficient to constitute the sexual 
connection necessary to the offence described in this section. ‘377B. Punishment 
for committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature. Whoever voluntarily 
commits carnal intercourse against the order of nature shall be punished with 
imprisonment for a term which may extend to twenty years, and shall also be liable 
to whipping. 377C. Committing carnal intercourse against the order of nature 
without consent, etc. Whoever voluntarily commits carnal intercourse against the 
order of nature on another person without the consent, or against the will, of the 
other person, or by putting other person in fear of death or hurt to the person or 
any other person, shall be punished with imprisonment for a term of not less than 
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for children against sexual abuse.40 But the two most significant changes were:
•	 For the first time in a British-derived legislative provision, ‘carnal 
intercourse’ was expressly defined as both anal and oral sex.
•	 In a vengeful and almost parodic response to the demands of women’s 
rights activists, the offence of ‘gross indecency’ was made gender-
neutral.41 It could now be applied to heterosexual couples – and also 
to lesbian and bisexual women. 42
A similar, regressive rape law change occurred in Sri Lanka. Falling back 
on religious and communal values, the state rejected women’s rights activists’ 
demands to legalise abortion, criminalise marital rape, and make the crime of 
rape gender-neutral. However, it did amend the ‘gross indecency’ provision to 
make it gender-neutral and apply to sex between women (Tambiah 1998).43
Meanwhile, in Botswana, legislators put gender-neutral language in both 
the ‘carnal knowledge’ and ‘gross indecency’ provisions of the British-derived 
Penal Code, in a general revision aiming at gender equity in 1998 (Long 2003, 
pp. 272–274).
five years and not more than twenty years, and shall also be liable to whipping’.
40 The provisions on ‘carnal intercourse’ continued to make no distinction between 
adults and children. The only specific protection for children was in the new 377E. 
‘Inciting a child to an act of gross indecency: Any person who incites a child under 
the age of fourteen years to any act of gross indecency with him or another person 
shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years, 
and shall also be liable to whipping’. However, the punishment for sexual relations 
with a girl under 16 (under ‘Rape’, Sec 375) is substantially higher, including 
imprisonment from five to 20 years. Penetrative rape of male children remained 
without specific mention in the code. 
41 ‘Sec 377D: Outrages on decency: Any person who, in public or private, commits, 
or abets the commission of, or procures or attempts to procure the commission by 
any person of, any act of gross indecency with another person, shall be punished 
with imprisonment for a term which may extend to two years’.
42 Courts have been slow to adopt this interpretation, however. As late as 1998 a court 
still held that the purpose of Sec 377D was to punish ‘gross indecency’ between 
men alone. (Sukma Darmawan Sasmitaat Madja v. Ketua Pengarah Penjara Malaysia 
& Anor 1998, p. 742). Meanwhile, the introduction of Islamic (Syariah) law in 
Malaysia has also created new or parallel sexual offences. Some states have passed 
Syariah Enforcement enactments, punishing not only Liwat – sodomy – but also 
Musahaqah, defined as ‘sexual relations between female persons’ and punished with 
three years’ imprisonment, fines, or whipping: see, e.g., Syariah Criminal Offences 
(Federal Territories) Act 1997, Sec 26.
43 One activist argues that ‘the criminalisation of lesbianism’ in Sri Lanka derives not 
just from a ‘lack of clarity’ about how to classify sexual behaviour before the law, 
but also from the stigma created by the ‘confusion between male homosexuality and 
pedophilia’ (Tambiah 1998). 
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V. Conclusion: the emancipatory potential of decriminalisation 
What are so-called ‘sodomy’ laws for?
South Africa’s Constitutional Court justice Albie Sachs, concurring with 
the historic decision to overturn his country’s law against sodomy, wrote:
It is important to start the analysis by asking what is really being 
punished by the anti-sodomy laws. Is it an act, or is it a person? Outside 
of regulatory control, conduct that deviates from some publicly 
established norm is usually only punishable when it is violent, dishonest, 
treacherous or in some other way disturbing of the public peace or 
provocative of injury. In the case of male homosexuality however, 
the perceived deviance is punished simply because it is deviant. It is 
repressed for its perceived symbolism rather than because of its proven 
harm .. . Thus, it is not the act of sodomy that is denounced … but 
the so-called sodomite who performs it; not any proven social damage, 
but the threat that same-sex passion in itself is seen as representing 
to heterosexual hegemony (National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian 
Equality v. Minister of Justice and Others 1999, p. 188).
The legal scholar Dan Kahan writes that ‘Sodomy laws, even when unenforced, 
express contempt for certain classes of citizens’ (Kahan 1999, p. 413). This 
contempt is not simply symbolic. Ryan Goodman, in exhaustive research 
based on interviews with lesbian and gay South Africans before the sodomy 
law was repealed, found the statutes have multiple ‘micro-level’ effects. These 
impacts are independent of occasions when the law is actually enforced. To the 
contrary: even without direct enforcement, the laws’ malign presence on the 
books still announces inequality, increases vulnerability, and reinforces second-
class status in all areas of life.
The laws ‘disempower lesbians and gays in a range of contexts far removed 
from their sexuality (for example, in disputes with a neighbour or as victims 
or burglary)’, Goodman writes. They influence other areas of knowledge: 
‘the criminalisation of homosexual practices interacts with other forms of 
institutional authority, such as religion and medicine’. The statutes empower 
social and cultural arbiters to call the homosexual a criminal. Goodman 
concludes that ‘The state’s relationship to lesbian and gay individuals under 
a regime of sodomy laws constructs … a dispersed structure of observation 
and surveillance. The public is sensitive to the visibility of lesbians and gays as 
socially and legally constructed miscreants’ (Goodman 2001).
This report suggests that the colonial-era sodomy laws ultimately became, 
not punishments for particular acts, but broad instruments of social control. 
They started as invaders’ impositions – an alien framework to subdue subject 
populations – and have morphed over time into alleged mirrors of a supposedly 
originary moral sense. States use them today to separate and brutalise those 
beyond those postulated primal norms. They are terms of division and tools 
of power.
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The real impact of sodomy laws – the way they single out people for legal 
retaliation, and make them ready victims of other forms of violence and abuse 
– appears in stories from six countries addressed in this report.
India
In July 2001, police in Lucknow arrested four staff members from two organisations 
that combated HIV/AIDS among men who have sex with men. The HIV/AIDS 
outreach workers from Naz Foundation International (NFI)’s Lucknow office 
and from Bharosa Trust were charged under Section 377 as well as with criminal 
conspiracy and ‘sale of obscene materials’: the police interpreted distributing 
information about AIDS prevention as running a gay ‘sex racket’.
They were jailed for 47 days. A Lucknow judge denied them bail, accusing 
them of ‘polluting the entire society’. The prosecutor in the case called homosexuality 
‘against Indian culture’ (Human Rights Watch 2002b). 
[…]
Pakistan
In late 2006, in Faisalabad, Shumail Raj and Shehzina Tariq married in a 
ceremony that Tariq described as ‘a love marriage’. Born a woman, Shumail Raj 
identified himself as a man.
The case led to a full-blown public panic, coursing through the media and 
eventually the courts. Raj had undergone two operations to alter his physical 
appearance to match the gender he lived in. Headlines nonetheless called them a 
‘she-couple’, a ‘same-sex couple’, and two ‘girls’ or ‘lesbians’, and described – and 
dismissed – their union as the country’s first same-sex marriage (Stern 2007). 
Shehzina Tariq’s father complained to police about the marriage, and they 
launched an investigation, invoking Section 377. Hauled before the High Court in 
Lahore, the couple told officials that Raj was a man.
A court-appointed panel of forensic doctors had, in the end, to try to settle the 
issue of legal identity (Stern 2007).
[…]
Prosecutors chose ultimately not to try the pair under 377; the uncertainty 
over Raj’s gender joined with the legal ambiguity over whether the law could be 
used against what officials now saw as a lesbian relationship. Clearly, though, the 
stigma the provision created helped set off the investigation and sustain hysterical 
public pressure. On May 28, 2007, a court sentenced the couple to three years’ 
imprisonment for perjuring themselves – for saying in court that Shumail Raj was 
a man. The judge called the sentence ‘lenient’ (The News 2007; Izam 2007).
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Sri Lanka
Extending criminal penalties in 1995 to include sexual acts between women led 
to an increased atmosphere of stigma and menace. The leader of an LGBT support 
group has reported having to leave the country for a time because of death threats 
(quoted in Arnold 2005). In 2000, when a lesbian conference was held on the 
island, a newspaper printed a letter to the editor urging the participants be raped, 
‘so that those wanton and misguided wretches may get a taste of the zest and relish 
of the real thing’.
The Press Council, a state body, rejected a complaint against the paper, citing 
the fact that ‘Homosexualism is an offence in our law. Lesbianism is at least an act 
of gross indecency and unnatural’. It stated:
Lesbianism itself is an act of sadism and salacious. Publication of any 
opinion against such activities is not tantamount to promoting sadism or 
salacity, but any publication which supports such conduct is an obvious 
promotion of all such violence, sadism, and salacity. Therefore, the 
complainant is the one who is eager to promote sadism and salicity, not 
the respondents.
The Council instead slapped a fine on the complainant, one of the conference’s 
organisers (International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission 2008). 
Singapore
Singapore police periodically use its laws on homosexual conduct to raid gay 
gathering places, including saunas: one raid in 2001 led to four men being charged 
initially under Section 377A, though the charge was later moved under Section 20 
of the Miscellaneous Offences (Public Order and Nuisance) Act. The men received a 
substantial fine.44 Further raids took place in April 2005 (Utopia-Asia.com 2005; 
Topix.com 2005). 45 
[…]
Uganda
For years, Uganda’s government has used the criminalisation of homosexual conduct 
to threaten and harass Ugandans. In 1998, President Yoweri Museveni told a press 
conference, ‘When I was in America, some time ago, I saw a rally of 300,000 
homosexuals. If you have a rally of 20 homosexuals here, I would disperse it’. True to 
his word, when (inaccurate) press reports the next year recounted a wedding between 
two men in Uganda, Museveni told a conference on reproductive health, ‘I have 
told the CID [Criminal Investigations Department] to look for homosexuals, lock 
44 600 Singapore dollars, the equivalent of about US$400 at the time (Yawningbread.
org 2001). 
45 Email to Human Rights Watch from a Singapore activist, November 20, 2008.
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them up, and charge them’. Police obediently jailed and tortured several suspected 
lesbians and gays; most later fled the country (Human Rights Watch/IGLHRC 
2003, pp. 50–51). 
Similarly, in October 2004, the country’s information minister, James Nsaba 
Buturo, ordered police to investigate and ‘take appropriate action against’ a gay 
association allegedly organised at Uganda’s Makerere University. On July 6, 2005, 
the government-owned New Vision newspaper urged authorities to crack down 
on homosexuality. […] That month, local government officers raided the home 
of Victor Mukasa, an activist for LGBT people’s human rights and chairperson 
of Sexual Minorities Uganda (SMUG). They seized papers and arrested another 
lesbian activist, holding her overnight (Human Rights Watch 2006). 
LGBT activists held a press conference in Kampala in August 2007, launching 
a public campaign they called ‘Let Us Live in Peace’. The next day, Buturo, now 
ethics and integrity minister, told the BBC that homosexuality was ‘unnatural’. 
He denied police harassment of LGBT people, but added menacingly, ‘We know 
them, we have details of who they are’. Four days later, the press announced that 
the attorney general had ordered lesbians and gays arrested. ‘I call upon the relevant 
agencies to take appropriate action because homosexuality is an offense under the 
laws of Uganda’, he reportedly said. ‘The penal code in no uncertain terms punishes 
homosexuality and other unnatural offenses’ (Human Rights Watch 2007b).  
[…]
Nigeria
Arrests under Nigeria’s federal sodomy law happen steadily, as local headlines 
suggest: ‘Paraded by Police for Homosexuality, Married Man Blames “Evil Spirit” 
For His Unholy Act’ (The Sun 2003); or ‘Caught in the Act: 28–yr-old Homosexual 
Arrested by OPC While in Action’.”46
Most of Nigeria’s Northern provinces now have their own penal codes. These 
combine principles of Islamic law with elements of the Northern Nigeria Penal 
Code adopted at the time of independence.47
The penal codes of Kano and Zamfara states have simply taken over the 
language of the British colonial provisions on ‘carnal intercourse against the order 
of nature’, and put it under the shari’a-esque heading of ‘sodomy (liwat)’. They 
provide punishments of 100 lashes for unmarried offenders, and death by stoning 
for married ones. The Zamfara Penal Code also criminalises ‘lesbianism (sihaq)’, 
46 Sunday Punch (2003), with picture of the man’s face, showing only his eyes blacked 
out.
47 The entire concept of codification is alien to the spirit and history of shari’a law, 
which traditionally is embodied in the scattered rulings of jurists in the four Sunni 
schools. That shari’a advocates in northern Nigeria have turned to imposing full-
fledged codes further reveals how the colonial legacy persists.
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punishing it with up to 50 lashes and six months’ imprisonment:
Whoever being a woman engages another woman in carnal intercourse 
through her sexual organ or by means of stimulation or sexual excitement 
of one another has committed the offence of Lesbianism. … The offence 
is committed by the unnatural fusion of the female sexual organs and 
or by the use of natural or artificial means to stimulate or attain sexual 
satisfaction or excitement.48
Courts in the north have handed down death sentences for homosexual conduct 
under the combined shari’a-and-colonial codes, though there have been no accounts 
of executions – yet. 
[…]
Although draconian provisions were in place at federal and state levels, Nigeria’s 
government tried to go further. In January 2006, the president’s office proposed new 
legislation called the ‘Same Sex Marriage (Prohibition) Act’. That was a misnomer: 
the bill’s reach went far beyond marriage. It would punish any ‘publicity, procession 
and public show of same sex amorous relationship through the electronic or print 
media physically, directly, indirectly or otherwise’, and adoption of children by 
lesbian or gay couples or individuals. It dictated five years’ imprisonment for anyone, 
including a cleric, who abetted a same-sex couple in marrying – and for any person 
‘ involved in the registration of gay clubs, societies and organisations, sustenance, 
procession or meetings, publicity and public show of same sex amorous relationship 
directly or indirectly in public and in private’. In addition to condemning to prison 
human rights defenders who address issues of sexuality, the bill could be used to jail 
even lesbian or gay couples holding hands (Human Rights Watch 2007a). 
Despite a push to rush the bill through the National Assembly in early 2007, 
it eventually died without a vote. It could, however, be revived at any time. In 
international arenas, Nigeria has continued its campaign, openly calling for killing 
people who engage in homosexual conduct. At the UN Human Rights Council in 
September 2006, Nigeria ridiculed ‘the notion that executions for offences such as 
homosexuality and lesbianism is [sic] excessive’. Its diplomat said: ‘What may be 
seen by some as disproportional penalty in such serious offences and odious conduct, 
may be seen by others as appropriate and just punishment’ (ARC International 
2006). 
It is appropriate to end with Nigeria, because the 2006 bill – criminalising 
all aspects of lesbian and gay identity and life – culminated the arc that 
Macaulay’s Indian Penal Code began. Its all-embracing provisions would 
render the bill uniquely severe among the world’s anti-gay laws. The trajectory 
from punishing acts to repressing a whole class of persons was complete.
The paradox remains that a democratic government promoted this 
48 Article 135 of the Zamfara Penal Code, www.zamfaraonline.com/sharia/chapter08.
html (accessed 25 Aug. 2008). See also Human Rights Watch (2004b).
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repressive legislation as part of indigenous values, although it actually extended 
old, undemocratic colonial statutes. ‘Basically it is un-African to have a 
relationship with the same sex,’ the Nigerian minister of justice said in 2006. 
A national newspaper intoned, ‘This progressive legislation is expected to put a 
check on homosexuality and lesbianism, a deviant social behaviour fast gaining 
acceptance in Western countries’. (IRIN Africa 2006).
Sodomy laws encourage all of society to join in surveillance, in a way 
congenial to the ambitions of police and state authorities. That may explain why 
large numbers of countries that have emerged from colonialism have assumed 
and assimilated their sodomy laws as part of the nationalist rhetoric of the 
modern state. Authorities have kept on refining and fortifying the provisions, 
in parliaments and courts – spurred by the false proposition they are a bulwark 
of authentic national identity.
The authoritarian impulse behind legal moves like Nigeria’s also points, 
though, to the emancipatory potential of decriminalising consensual 
homosexual sex.
The campaigns for law reform are not merely for a right to intimacy, but 
for the right to live a life without fear of discrimination, exposure, arrest, 
detention, or harassment. Reform would dismantle part of the legal system’s 
power to divide and discriminate, to criminalise personhood and identity, to 
attack rights defenders, and to restrict civil society.
Removing the sodomy laws would affirm human rights and dignity. It 
would also repair a historical wrong that demands to be remembered. The 
legacy of colonialism should no longer be confused with cultural authenticity 
or national freedom. An activist from Singapore writes: ‘It’s amazing,’ that 
millions of people ‘have so absorbed Victorian prudishness that even now, 
when their countries are independent – and they are all happy and proud 
they’re free from the yoke of the British – they stoutly defend these laws’. He 
concludes, ‘The sun may have set on the British Empire, but the Empire lives 
on’ (Yawningbread.org 2004). These last holdouts of the Empire have outlived 
their time.
Recommendations
To all governments, including those that inherited British colonial laws 
criminalising homosexual conduct:
•	 Repeal all laws that criminalise consensual sexual activity among 
adult people of the same sex.
•	 Ensure that criminal and other legal provisions of general application 
are not used to punish consensual sexual activity among adults of the 
same sex.
•	 Pass laws defining the crime of rape in a gender-neutral way so that 
the rape of men by men, or of women by women, is included in the 
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definition and subject to equal punishment.
•	 Pass laws expressly criminalising the rape or sexual abuse of children.
•	 Consistent with the principle of non-discrimination, ensure that an 
equal age of consent applies to both same-sex and different-sex sexual 
activity.
•	 Repeal any law that prohibits or criminalises the expression of gender 
identity, including through dress, speech or mannerisms, or that 
denies individuals the opportunity to change their bodies as a means 
of expressing their gender identity.
To the Commonwealth Secretariat:
•	 Consistent with the 1971 Singapore Declaration of Commonwealth 
Principles, which affirms ‘the liberty of the individual’, ‘equal rights 
for all citizens’, and ‘guarantees for personal freedom’, condemn 
and call for the removal of all remaining British colonial laws that 
criminalise consensual sexual activity among adult people of the same 
sex.
•	 As part of Commonwealth programs to help member nations 
implement international obligations in their laws, promote the 
decriminalisation of consensual, adult homosexual conduct.
•	 Also as part of these programs, develop models for gender-neutral 
legislation on rape and sexual abuse, and for the protection of 
children.
•	 Integrate issues of sexual orientation and gender identity into all 
human rights educational and training activities, including the 
Commonwealth Human Rights Training Programme for police.
To the United Nations and its human rights mechanisms:
•	 Consistent with the decision of the UN Human Rights Committee 
in the 1994 decision of Toonen v. Australia, condemn and call for 
the removal of all remaining laws that criminalise consensual sexual 
activity among adult people of the same sex, as violations of basic 
human rights to privacy and equality.
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